Dear All,

Thanks to Geoff for bringing this to our attention. Just as a footnote to the proposal concerning the Bills of Rights Act: The Law Commission for England and Wales’s recent Consultation Paper on Administrative Redress, which proposes many things about the relationship between private and public law, had this to say on limitation periods at para 4.206:

"At present, an application for judicial review must be made promptly and in any event not later than three months after the grounds for the claim first arose.175 Time may be extended, if good reasons exist. For actions in tort, the general rule is that actions must be brought within six years,176 or three years if the claim

involves personal injury.177 We are not proposing any changes to these limitation periods. It is suggested that the action in public law would be subject to the same limitation period as other judicial review cases and that the action in private law be subject to a similar limitation period as similar tort actions.

175 Civil Procedure Rules, r 54.5(1).

176 Limitation Act 1980, s 2. Note that an overriding time limit of fifteen years applies to claims

in negligence which do not involve personal injury: s 14B.

177 Above, s 11."

For claims by victims against public authorities who have acted in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right under the Human Rights Act 1998, s.7(5) of the Act applies:

"Proceedings under subsection (1)(a) must be brought before the end of—

(a) the period of one year beginning with the date on which the act complained of took place; or

(b) such longer period as the court or tribunal considers equitable having regard to all the circumstances,

but that is subject to any rule imposing a stricter time limit in relation to the procedure in question."

Incidentally, since I mention the Law Commission, colleagues may be interested to know that Sir James Munby, whose judgments will be familiar to some members of this list (Commerzbank Ag v Price-Jones [2003] EWCA Civ 1663, for example), has been appointed as the new Chairman of our Law Commission: http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/Munby_appointment.pdf.

Best wishes,

James

--

James Lee

Lecturer

Director of the LLB Programme

Birmingham Law School

University of Birmingham

Edgbaston

Birmingham

B15 2TT, United Kingdom

Tel: +44 (0)121 414 3629

E-mail: j.s.f.lee@bham.ac.uk

________________________________________

From: Tettenborn, A [A.M.Tettenborn@exeter.ac.uk]

Sent: 05 August 2009 09:07

To: obligations@uwo.ca

Subject: FW: New Limitations law in New Zealand

I rather like the Bill: and you'll certainly have time to ponder it in NZ (as I read it nothing will happen till 2012 when the first defamation claims become barred).

But a couple of thoughts do strike me.

(1) It's a pity that s.46 effectively leaves the possibility of an infinite period of limitation for undiscovered fraud. Arguably even fraudsters -- especially fraudsters through vicarious liability -- deserve some longstop protection from very hoary claims.

(2) It's all very well getting rid of the "accrual" date as  a criterion when you're dealing with an act by the defendant. But omissions look like a different kettle of fish. Telling precisely when nothing happened looks to me like an intriguing and esoteric art, and arguing about it might make arguing about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin seem positively straightforward. I hope I'm wrong, but I wouldn't be surprised in generations of NZ lawyers pay the school fees on the proceeds of so doing.

Best for the summer vacation

Andrew

________________________________________

From: Neil Foster [Neil.Foster@newcastle.edu.au]

Sent: 05 August 2009 00:55

To: obligations@uwo.ca; Geoff McLay

Subject: Re: New Limitations law in New Zealand

Dear Geoff;

Thanks for your very helpful note about this, mate. My initial reaction as someone interested in the theory is not to pay attention to limitations stuff too closely, but the more I study this area the more I see how strongly (of course) limitations legislation has an impact on the "black letter law" developed by the courts. And since New Zealand has an interesting habit of pioneering developments which later common law jurisdictions pick up, it will be fascinating for us over the pond here in Australia to see how this pans out.

Regards

Neil

Neil Foster

Senior Lecturer, LLB Program Convenor

Newcastle Law School

Faculty of Business & Law

MC158, McMullin Building

University of Newcastle

Callaghan NSW 2308

AUSTRALIA

ph 02 4921 7430

fax 02 4921 6931

>>> Geoff McLay <Geoff.McLay@vuw.ac.nz> 5/08/09 9:09 >>>

Dear all

Something happened yesterday never thought I would see actually happened.  Two decades after the Law Commission first recommended wholesale reform of New Zealand Limitations Act 1950,  Parliament gave the first reading to a new Limitations Bill. Up until yesterday Parliament had resolutely refused the pleas of Judges to deal with what has become an impossible mess as advocates have tried to fit within the structures of the old English limitations regime, new problems over sexual abuse claims and claims for economic loss under the rule in Hamlin.

For the first time New Zealand is to have its own indigenous limitations regime.  New Zealand lawyers will no longer be able to rely on outdated English textbooks to resolve thorny issues of balancing the rights of plaintiffs to be heard and defendants to have certainty.  The most radical proposal is the removal of "accrual of the cause of action" as being the beginning of limitation period, which can give vastly different results depending on whether one has a tort claim or a contract claim.  There is to be a single rule  which makes the start date, the time of the act or omissions that give rise to the claim. One of the prime drivers for New Zealand courts accepting that there might be concurrent liability in tort and contract is now to be removed.

 For the first time fiduciary claims will be caught by the strictures of the Limitation act rather than by the more generous application of the doctrine of laches.  This might also be of some controversy to those who see equity as protecting a kind of vulnerability that makes a more discretionary approach to limitations more desirable.  Certainly it ought to be the subject of submission in select committee. There will no longer be an advantage in trying to convince the Court that there was a fiduciary aspect of the claim simply as a way of getting around the limitation period might apply to a tort claim.

The limited fix of "reasonable discoverability" that New Zealand Courts have employed and economic loss cases, and to some extent sex abuse cases, to deal with injustices of plaintiffs being unaware of the damage that they had all the suffered, or unable to do anything about that harm, is to be replaced by a concept of " delayed knowledge" ( including where the plaintiff ought to have reasonably known) which can allow a period to be extended by further three years from the date of that knowledge.  There is to be a maximum long stop period of 15 years which will bar almost all claims.  One exception is to be sexual abuse claims that are subject to their own discretionary regime, somewhat modeled on what now exists in the United Kingdom.  Plaintiffs and those cases in particular would be saved the rather harrowing effort to satisfy the somewhat odd test currently employed by the New Zealand courts.

Other potentially significant aspects of the reform is that claims under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act would be subject to the same regime as other claims.  Previously the New Zealand Court of Appeal had held that it preferred to analyse the claims are discretionary Sugrue (P F)Ltd v Attorney General [2004] 1 NZLR 207 (CA).  Amongst rights advocates this will no doubt generate some controversy -   As might the note in the "impact" statement:

Government as litigant: Government will benefit from greater clarity in this area in the same manner as other litigants. The introduction of a 6year limitation period for certain public law compensation claims will provide certainty and will encourage claimants to take action diligently.

Government as administrator of the courts: There may also be costs savings if courts are able to dispose more efficiently of claims where limitation is an issue. There may be some reduction in cases I plaintiffs and defendants are more readily able to determine how the limitation defence affects their claim. It is not possible to estimate these savings as there is no information about the number of cases where limitation is presently an issue and no means of quantifying the potential impact on litigation decisions.

The bill can be found at http://www.parliament.nz/en-NZ/PB/Legislation/Bills/9/2/4/00DBHOH_BILL9236_1-Limitation-Bill.htm